The End of “the End of History”
In the heady, triumphalist atmosphere following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 thesis, The End of History and the Last Man, posited that the universalization of Western liberal democracy marked the “end of history”, the cessation of ideological struggle. Today, this notion feels less like prophecy and more like a historical relic. The current global landscape, marked by conflict, ideological fervor, and the re-emergence of great power competition, confirms a stark reality: history has not ended; it has returned with a vengeance.
The failure of the “End of History” is evident in the revival of potent political forces that liberal democracy was supposed to have tamed. Ideology is resurgent, not merely as a critique of the liberal order, but as a fully articulated alternative. China’s model of state-led capitalism and digital authoritarianism offers a compelling, high-growth counter-narrative, demonstrating that economic success is not exclusive to the liberal democratic model. Simultaneously, the rise of nationalism has fractured the post-Cold War consensus on global integration. The United Kingdom’s Brexit vote and the electoral success of far-right, nativist parties across Europe, such as the National Rally in France and the AfD in Germany, show the primacy of the nation-state and ethnic identity replacing cosmopolitan idealism. This is often coupled with a slide toward authoritarianism, exemplified by the sustained decline in global freedom scores and the consolidation of power in nations like Hungary, Turkey, and India, where democratic institutions are being hollowed out from within. This is history’s revenge: the return of the very forces of identity and collective belief that were declared obsolete.
This chaotic return to a multipolar world is best understood through the lens of realist international relations theory. Realism, which Fukuyama’s thesis sought to supersede, holds that international politics is fundamentally a struggle for power among self-interested states in an anarchic system. The current geopolitical flashpoints are textbook examples of this enduring struggle. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, for instance, is a classic realist power play, a direct challenge to the post-1991 security architecture and a bid to re-establish a sphere of influence. The conflict is a brutal reminder that the ultimate guarantor of a state’s survival is its own power. Similarly, China’s aggressive expansion in the South China Sea and its massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are strategic moves to project power and reshape the global economic order in Beijing’s favor. These actions underscore the realist conviction that military and economic might, not shared values, remain the ultimate currency of international affairs. The world is once again a chessboard of competing national interests, exactly as classical realists like Hans Morgenthau predicted.
Yet, the nature of the challenge also demands a post-liberal analysis. While realism explains the what (power politics), a post-liberal perspective helps explain the why, the internal decay of the liberal project that created the vacuum for these forces to thrive. Post-liberalism suggests that the liberal order failed to satisfy the human need for meaning, community, and identity, prioritizing instead economic efficiency and individual autonomy to the point of social atomization.
This void has been eagerly filled by populist movements that fuse economic grievance with cultural nationalism. The rise of figures like Donald Trump in the United States and various far-right leaders in Europe is a direct consequence. These movements reject the technocratic, globalist consensus of the liberal elite, offering instead a politics of identity, sovereignty, and cultural restoration. They weaponize the tools of liberal society to undermine its institutions, demonstrating that the threat to the liberal order is not solely external, but deeply internal.
The “End of History” was a beautiful, but ultimately fragile, dream built on the premise that human nature would subordinate its ancient drives for identity and power to the rational efficiency of the market and the state. It failed to account for the enduring human need for recognition, which Fukuyama himself identified as the engine of history. When the liberal state failed to provide that recognition, or when globalization left large segments of the population feeling culturally and economically disenfranchised, the door was opened for illiberal alternatives. The events of the past decade, from the trenches of Ukraine to the polarized politics of Western capitals, have shattered the illusion of a final, settled political order. We are not living in a post-historical utopia, but in a messy, dangerous, and all-too-familiar world where ideology, nationalism, and the relentless pursuit of power are once again the primary engines of global change. History has returned, and the struggle for the future is just beginning, demanding a renewed commitment to the substance of liberal democracy.
