Why Eurasia’s “New Order” Risks Repackaging Old Illusions
It has become fashionable to claim that the contemporary world is too fragmented to reproduce any historical model of order. Commentators insist that neither the nineteenth century balance of power nor the Cold War’s rigid bipolarity can be restored. This argument is partly correct, yet it hides a deeper and more uncomfortable truth. The real problem is not that the old models cannot be revived. The problem is that the very concept of legitimacy in international politics has fractured. Eurasia’s proposed “new order” often attempts to revive a framework that no longer reflects the realities of global power.
Advocates of a Eurasian security architecture frequently elevate mutual recognition to a foundational principle. They argue that nineteenth century diplomacy succeeded because major powers admitted one another as legitimate. However, this narrative romanticizes history. The Concert of Europe survived not because of shared respect but because of a temporary convergence of strategic fears and a fragile balance of military capabilities. Whenever those conditions shifted the system collapsed.
To claim that Eurasia can replicate this principle ignores the structural reality that today’s major powers do not operate under symmetrical constraints. The economic and military asymmetries between China, Russia, India, Turkey and smaller states make true mutual recognition unrealistic. The language of sovereign equality masks the fact that some states possess disproportionate leverage and others survive through hedging. The rhetoric promises reciprocity that the power distribution cannot support.
Many Eurasian governments call for a sovereignty based order, yet they apply this norm inconsistently. Russia’s interventions in Ukraine, China’s coercive diplomacy toward its neighbors and the Gulf states’ extraterritorial practices show that sovereignty is defended only when convenient. A principle invoked selectively cannot serve as the foundation of a legitimate order.
Moreover sovereignty is often framed not as a mutual restraint mechanism but as a shield against criticism. This undermines the very idea of legitimacy. An order built on the premise that domestic governance is exempt from any external evaluation might protect regimes, yet it does not produce stability. Historically the most durable orders emerged not from the isolation of domestic politics but from predictable rules governing external behavior. Eurasia has not articulated such rules.
Proponents of a Eurasian-centered system sometimes celebrate political diversity as a strength. However, diversity alone does not create order. The absence of shared expectations leads to miscalculations, not stability. States with incompatible security cultures and conflicting historical memories cannot simply co exist peacefully by invoking sovereignty. The idea that a pluralistic Eurasia will naturally converge on a common definition of legitimacy is aspirational rather than analytical.
The uncomfortable reality is that Eurasia lacks the norm-setting institutions that once allowed Europe to manage its conflicts. It also lacks a hegemon capable of enforcing discipline. In such an environment legitimacy cannot be engineered from declarations. It must emerge from consistent behavior, which the region has yet to demonstrate.
Another common assumption is that connectivity, corridors and infrastructure projects will supply the glue that political institutions lack. Yet economic interdependence only stabilizes relations when the actors perceive the benefits as mutual and secure. In Eurasia these conditions are weak. Many states fear overdependence on China. Others perceive Russian security structures as tools of coercion rather than collaboration. Multilateral organizations exist, but few possess enforcement mechanisms or shared strategic vision.
Thus interdependence without trust creates vulnerability rather than legitimacy. It encourages defensive nationalism rather than cooperation. At the heart of the Eurasian legitimacy project lies a contradiction. Its architects reject Western models as outdated or intrusive, yet they do not offer a coherent alternative. Sovereignty is presented as the master principle, but sovereignty alone cannot prevent rivalry. No clear guidelines define what constitutes unacceptable interference. No shared understanding regulates military modernization. No mechanism exists to prevent escalation when crises emerge.
The proposed “new order” therefore risks becoming a rebranded version of classical power politics. It may function temporarily when major powers find their interests aligned, yet it lacks the intellectual and institutional foundations necessary for long term stability.
Eurasia’s geopolitical diversity and strategic ambition demand original thinking. However, the region cannot build a sustainable order by selectively invoking the language of sovereignty and mutual respect. These concepts only work when they are backed by shared rules and predictable behavior.
If Eurasia wants to contribute a genuinely new model of legitimacy, it must move beyond romanticized notions of nineteenth century diplomacy and confront the power imbalances, normative contradictions and strategic mistrust that shape its present reality. Only then can it claim to offer something more than a rhetorical alternative to the Western led order.
